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Abstract
Modelling of contagion in interbank networks is discussed. A model
taking into account bow-tie structure and dissasortativity of interbank
networks is developed. The model is shown to provide a good quantita-
tive description of the Russian interbank market. Detailed arguments
favoring the non-percolative nature of contagion-related risks in the
Russian interbank market are given.
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1 Introduction
Quantitative analysis of systemic risks in financial networks presents one
of the most important applications of network theory related ideas. These
studies belong to a wide strand of literature devoted to analysis of cascading
failures in complex networks, see e.g. [1, 2]. One of the important topics is
here developing network-based mathematical models of contagion propaga-
tion in interbank markets [3, 4, 5, 15]. Constructing relevant mathematical
models of default propagation is nontrivial due to the necessity of reproduc-
ing such observed features of these networks as their scale-free nature and
significant dissasortativity and clustering [12, 13, 14] and bow-tie structure
[13, 14, 15]. In the literature one can find methods of taking into account
dissasortativity [6, 7, 8] and clustering [9, 10], but these and similar con-
siderations have to be transplanted into developing mathematical models of
interbank loan networks allowing to reproduce their main features.
2 Interbank network and contagion
In what follows we characterize interbank credit market in terms of a weighted
oriented graph characterized by the weighted adjacency matrix W = {wij ≥
0} where link variables wij > 0 correspond to netted obligations of the bank
i towards the bank j on the daily basis. A directed link i → j corresponds
to a credit to i provided by j. For a given node outgoing links correspond
therefore to its obligations towards neighboring nodes and incoming ones to
claims of the node under consideration towards neighboring nodes so that
default contagion propagates through the outgoing links. Out considerations
are based on the data on Russian interbank market (see Fig. 1) from January
11, 2011 till December 30, 2013 and contain information on interbank loans
to residents for 185 banks.
3 Gai - Kapadia contagion model
Let us turn to describing the mechanics of default propagation in more details
and consider a network node i having k incoming links with weights {wki},
j = 1, · · · , k corresponding to obligations of these j banks with respect to
the bank i. Let us now assume1 that one of these j banks j∗ defaults. The
default propagates (contagion takes place) if this causes default of the node i,
1Here and in what follows we consider only the simplest case in which we have only
one originally defaulting node.
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Figure 1: Russian interbank network
see Fig. 2. In the simplest setting this happens when the loss of wj∗i destroys
the institutionally required balance between j’s actives Ai and obligations Li.
The model of [3] assumes that for all nodes the sum of all node’s interbank
assets AIBi , A
IB
i ≡
∑k
j=1wjk, is evenly distributed over k incoming links.
A default of any of the neighboring nodes causes contagion if it makes the
capital buffer Ki ≡ Ai − Li negative
2:
Ki ≡ Ai − Li <
AIBi
k
(3.1)
A tractable analytical model of default propagation developed in [3] is based
on a probabilistic description of contagion by introducing a probability vk
that the bank i is vulnerable, i.e. that it defaults because of defaulting of
one of its counterparties:
vk = Prob
[
Ki <
AIBi
k
]
(3.2)
A process of contagion is in these terms that of formation of a cluster of
vulnerable nodes formed around the initially defaulting one, see Fig. 2.
2Here it is assumed that the institutional requirement on the capital buffer is Ki ≥ 0
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Assuming the absence of correlations between the adjacent nodes the full
Figure 2: Default propagation mechanism
probabilistic description of a problem can then given in terms the following
generating function:
G(x, y) =
∑
j,k
vjpjkx
jyk, (3.3)
where pjk is a probability of having j incoming and k outgoing links.
Introducing the generating function G0(y) and G1(y) for the out-degrees
of the vulnerable bank and its vulnerable neighbor respectively
G0(y) =
∑
j,k
vj · pjk · y
k, G1(y) =
∑
j,k vj · j · pjk · y
k∑
j,k j · pjk
(3.4)
we get a standard set of equations for the size of vulnerable cluster reached
by following and arbitrary link leading from the initial vulnerable node H1(y)
and the total size of the vulnerable cluster H0(y):
H0(y) = 1−G0(1) + yG0[H1(y)]
k
H1(y) = 1−G1(1) + yG1[H1(y)] (3.5)
and, consequently, the following equation for the average size S of a default
cluster formed by following the outgoing links joining vulnerable nodes:
S = G0(1) +
G′0(1)G1(1)
1−G′1(1)
(3.6)
In Ref. [3] systemic risk was defined as an appearance of the giant vulnerable
cluster at the point G′1(1) = 1. Let us note that numerical simulations in [3]
were performed using the Poissonian distribution for the number of outgoing
links.
The analysis of [3] was further developed in [5] where a dependence of
percolation threshold on replacing poisson degree distribution by a scale-free
one and on degree-degree correlations was studied.
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4 Contagion model with bow-tie structure and
dissasortativity
In this section we discuss a model of contagion propagation in interbank mar-
kets explicitly taking into account the bow-tie topology of the correspond-
ing network, its dissasortativity and the tree-like nature of default clusters3
[13, 14, 15]. The consideration in [13, 14, 15] uses the daily data on the Rus-
sian interbank market. The model accounts for detailed probabilistic patterns
existing between adjacent nodes characterized by conditional probabilities of
default propagation v(u, t|k, l) and link multiplicity P (u, t|k, l), where u and
t are the number of incoming and outgoing links for the lender while k and l
are the numbers of incoming and outgoing links for the borrower. The condi-
tional probabilities v(u, t|k, l) and P (u, t|k, l) depend on the position of the
corresponding nodes in the bow-tie structure so that the formalism includes
conditional probabilities vIO→IO(u, t|k, l) and P IO→IO(u, t|k, l) if both nodes
belong to the In-Out component, etc.
4.1 Existence of giant cluster
We have already mentioned a theoretically appealing definition of systemic
risk as of the appearance of the giant cluster [3].The practical relevance of
this definition does however depend on whether formation of such a cluster
is possible in real interbank networks. To answer this question one has to
convert information on interbank loans and bank balance sheets into condi-
tional probability distributions v(u, t|k, l) and P (u, t|k, l) thus specifying the
structure of clusters of vulnerable nodes. For tree-like oriented graphs the
condition of existence of a giant out-cluster can be formulated in terms of a
condition λmax > 1 on the maximal eigenvalue of the matrix
A(k,l)(u,t) = uP (u, t|k, l)v(u, t|k, l), (4.1)
see e.g. [17, 7, 18]4. The details can be found in the Appendix. The dynamics
of λmax for the Russian interbank network is shown in Fig. 4.1. We see that
the maximal observed value of λmax is 0.35, so according to this criterion in
hte Russian interbank market the systemic risk as defined in [3] is absent.
3This observation is similar to the one made in [11]. We are grateful to C. Borgs for
this reference.
4In actual calculations it is convenient to change notations so that with each pair (k, l)
and (u, t) one associates a natural number. A discussion of the origin of the criterion
λmax > 1 can be found in [8]
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Figure 3: Dynamics of the maximal eigenvalue of A. The data was sampled
with a frequency of one month.
4.2 Mean default cluster size
The mathematical model we use to describe systemic risks on the Russian in-
terbank market developed in [15] generalizes the approach of [3] by explicitly
taking into account the bow-tie structure of the network under consideration
and its dissasortaivity. This means, in particular, that one has to consider
two separate mechanisms of contagion propagation, those from the In-Out
component to the In one, see Fig. 4 a, and within the In-Out component, see
Fig. 4 b.
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The corresponding generating functions read
Nk,l(y) =
∞∑
r
P IO→In(r|k, l)
(
1− vIO→In(r|k, l) + y vIO→In(r|k, l)
)
(4.2)
Mk,l(x, y) =
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)(1− vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)) + (4.3)
x
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)[Mu,t(x, y)]
u[Nu,t(y)]
t
Let us consider a bank from the In-Out component with k + l outgoing
links, where k of them lead to the In-Out- component and l to In- component
respectively5 and take a randomly chosen edge linking the chosen node to
a node in the In- component which, in addition, has r − 1 incoming links,
see Fig. 4 a. This is a simplest case where contagion goes from the In-Out-
component to the In-one and stops there.
Let us introduce a generating function F (x, y) =
∞∑
k,l
P IO(k, l)xkyl for the
probability for a bank from the In-Out- component to have k and l first
neighbors from the In-Out- and In- components respectively. Then F (M,N)
is the generation function for the number of vulnerable banks in the network.
The mean size of vulnerable cluster 〈s〉 is then given by its derivative at
y = x = 1:
〈s〉 = F ′x(y = x = 1) (4.4)
We have
F ′(M,N) =
∞∑
k,l
P IO(k, l)(kM ′k,l + lN
′
k,l), (4.5)
Straightforward calculations [15] lead to the following expressions for N ′ and
M ′:
N ′k,l|x=1 =
∞∑
r
P IO→In(r|k, l)vIO→In(r|k, l) (4.6)
M ′k,l =
∞∑
u,t
βk,l,u,tγu,t (4.7)
5As discussed in [15], nodes from the Out- component generate very small systemic
risks so that the corresponding effects will be neglected
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a)
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Figure 4: Default spreading mechanism
where βk,l,u,t is an element B(u,t),(k,l) of the matrix B = (I −A)
−1 and A is a
k × l, k × l matrix size with the elements A(k,l)(u,t) = αu,t,k,l, where in turn
αu,t,k,l =
∞∑
r
uP IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) (4.8)
and
γk,l =
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)
+
∞∑
u,t,r
P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l)
× t
∞∑
r1
P IO→In(r1|u, t)v
IO→In(r1|u, t) (4.9)
Plugging in empirical conditional probability distributions P IO→In(r|k, l),
vIO→In(r|k, l), P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) and vIO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) calculated on the monthly
8
basis we compute the corresponding values of 〈s〉. A comparison of the
model predictions and results of stress testing are shown in Fig.5. We see a
very good agreement between the model and experiment provided one takes
into account correlations between the degrees of adjacent nodes captured
by P IO→In(r|k, l) and P IO→IO(u, t, r|k, l) and a much poorer one when these
correlations are neglected.
0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
Empirical default cluster size
Th
eo
re
tic
al
 d
ef
a
u
lt 
cl
us
te
r s
ize
With correlations
Without correlations
Figure 5: Theoretical and empirical mean default cluster size
5 Conclusions
Let us formulate once again the main conclusions of the present paper:
1. Analysis of data on Russian interbank market shows that default con-
tagion risks can be classified as those characteristic of non-percolative
phase.
2. To build a successful mathematical model of contagion propagation the
bow-tie structure of the corresponding network and its dissasortativity
have to be taken into account.
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Appendix
Let us consider formation of giant out-cluster in an oriented graph character-
ized by the degree distribution, i.e. the probability of having k incoming and
l outgoing links pkl, and probability distribution P (u, t|k, l), the conditional
probability of having u incoming and t outgoing links for a first neighbor of
the node having k incoming and l outgoing links.
The mean number of first neighbors that can be reached by following the
outgoing links z1 is conveniently computed using the corresponding generat-
ing function F (x):
z1 =
dF (x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
∞∑
k,l
kpkl, F (x) =
∞∑
k=0,l=0
pklx
k (.1)
To calculate the mean number of second neighbors let us use a construc-
tion described, e.g., in [19] and introduce a generating function M(k,l)(x) for
the number of incoming and outgoing links of a vertex reached from the
original one by following one of its outgoing links:
M(k,l)(x) = x
∞∑
u,t
P (u, t|k, l)xu
Let us denote the number of the n-th level neighbors by zn consider the
total number mn of neighbors up to level n:
m1 = z1, m2 = z1 + z2, · · · , mn =
n∑
i=1
zi
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Then
m2 =
dF (M(x))
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
∂F
∂M(k,l)
∂M(k,l)
∂x
=
∞∑
k,l
kpkl +
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l)
z2 = m2 − z1 =
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l)
Analogously
m3 =
dF (M(M,x))
dx
∣∣∣∣
x=1
=
∂F
∂M(k,l)
[
∂M(k,l)
∂M(u,t)
∂M(u,t)
∂x
+
∂M(k,l)
∂x
]
=
∞∑
k,l
kpkl +
∞∑
kl
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l)
+
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l)
∞∑
u1,t1
u1P (u1, t1|u, t)
z3 = m3 −m2 =
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l)
∞∑
u1,t1
u1P (u1, t1|u, t),
and, generically,
zn =
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l) · ... ·
∞∑
un−1,tn−1
un−1P (un−1, tn−1|un−2, tn−2)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n summations
.
The mean number of all neighbors is thus given by
∞∑
i=1
zi =
∞∑
k,l
kpkl[1+
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l)+
∞∑
u,t
uP (u, t|k, l)
∞∑
u1,t1
u1P (u1, t1|u, t)+...]
(.2)
The giant component exists if the sum (.2) diverges.
Let us now discuss the conditions for the existence of a giant component.
Defining A(k,l)(u,t) = uP (u, t|k, l), we can rewrite (.2) as follows:
∞∑
i=1
zi =
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
[I(k,l)(u,t) + A(k,l)(u,t) + (A
2)(k,l)(u,t) + ...]
=
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
[I + A+ A2 + ...](k,l)(u,t) (.3)
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Let us assume that
∞∑
k,l
kpkl < ∞. For the sum (.3) to converge the
operator A has to be linear and bounded, ‖A‖ < 1. Then there exist an
operator (I−A)−1 =
∞∑
n=0
An and the sum (.3) can be rewritten in the following
form:
∞∑
i=1
zi =
∞∑
k,l
kpkl
∞∑
u,t
[I −A]−1(k,l)(u,t) (.4)
The condition ‖A‖ < 1 leads us to a simple criterion for the absence of a
giant cluster: if the maximal eigenvalue of A satisfies λmax < 1, there is no
giant Out-component6. Let us also note that according to Perron-Frobenius
theorem the maximal eigenvalue satisfies
λmax ≤ max
(k,l)
∞∑
u,t
A(k,l)(u,t)
.
6Here we have used the spectral theorem stating that the spectral radius of A is equal
to its norm and the Perron-Frobenius theorem, according to which for non-negative matrix
its spectral radius is equal to its maximal eigenvalue.
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